We analyze and estimate an adaptive learning model which explicitly considers strategic uncertainty in order to provide a unified explanation of the patterns of Ž equilibrium selection in J.
INTRODUCTION
As economics has grown increasingly game-theoretic the limitations of its most commonly used solution concept, the Nash equilibrium, have become apparent. On one hand, the weakest sufficient conditions for Ž equilibrium available for general non dominance-solvable games Aumann Ž . . and Brandenburger 1995 , Theorems A and B are much stronger than the individual rationality assumption commonly used in economics. On the Ž other, a large body of experimental evidence see, for example, Cooper et Ž . Ž . Ž . al. 1990 , Brandts and Holt 1992 , Van Huyck et al. 1990 , 1991 , 1993 , Ž .. and Cachon and Camerer 1996 suggests that, in laboratory settings, equilibrium behavior is more likely to emerge as the limiting outcome of subjects' repeated interactions and that equilibrium refinements often have little discriminatory power in games with multiple equilibria.
Not surprisingly, we have witnessed in recent years a clear change in emphasis from equilibrium analysis as a normative prescription about how a game ought to be played towards the study of more descriptive models of Ž strategic sophistication Palfrey, 1992, 1994; Stahl and . Wilson 1995 , of how equilibrium conventions may emerge from repeated interactions ᎏoften among boundedly rational agentsᎏas in the ''learn-Ž Ž . Ž . ing'' literature Crawford 1995 , Roth and Erev 1995 , Cheung and Ž . Ž . . Friedman 1997 , and Camerer and Ho 1999 , to name a few , and of the Ž cognitive foundations of strategic behavior Camerer et al., 1993; Costa-. Gomes et al., 1998 . And it was only natural that the need to supplement theory with other sources of information in order to address such fundamental issues would result in an increasingly fruitful dialogue between Ž Ž . game theorists and experimental economists see Crawford 1997 for a . survey .
The starting points of this paper are the related adaptive learning Ž . Ž . models in Crawford 1995 and Broseta 1993 , which attempt to explain the remarkable experimental results on equilibrium selection in repeated Ž .Ž . coordination games by Van Huyck et al. 1990 , 1991 hereafter VHBB . Ž By explicitly incorporating strategic uncertainty i.e., players' uncertainty . Ž . about each other's choices the analyses in Crawford 1995 and Broseta Ž . 1993 yield a unified explanation of VHBB's results as persistent effects of its interactions with players' learning rules. In this explanation, players' strategy choices are perturbed each period by independently and identically distributed random shocks. These shocks represent strategic uncertainty in terms of idiosyncratic differences in players' prior beliefs and updating rules, and their variances represent the initial level of strategic uncertainty and how it evolves over time. If the variance of the innovations declines fast enoughᎏand eventually, converges to 0ᎏas the players learn to forecast each other's responses, the dynamics will lock in on a particular equilibrium in the limit. The model's implications for equilibrium selection can then be summarized by the prior probability distribution of that equilibrium.
Ž . Ž . The models in Crawford 1995 and Broseta 1993 share the same theoretical structure but differ in the stochastic processes used to describe the dynamics of players' beliefs and strategy choices. They also share a Ž ''hybrid'' nature in that their quantitative implications and their explana-. tory power depend on behavioral parameters, which must be estimated econometrically. There are two reasons for this. First, the model cannot provide a convincing explanation of VHBB's results unless there are significant differences in players' beliefs, which eventually vanish as they learn from their repeated interactions. But there are no informational asymmetries or externally observable differences across players on which to base a purely theoretical explanation of these differences, nor can theory alone convincingly determine their stochastic structure. The model's explanation must therefore be partly empirical and must rest on a realistic model of the stochastic process that represents strategic uncertainty and how it varies over time. Second, the theoretical models' implications are probabilistic in that they do not attempt to precisely predict subjects' behavior along the path of play but, instead, attempt to characterize the limiting probability distribution over outcomes generated by the learning dynamics. This probability distribution partly depends on the parameters of players' updating rules, which may vary across experimental treatments and therefore have to be estimated on a case by case basis.
Since fully developing the model's implications depends on estimating its behavioral parameters econometrically, specification issues may play a crucial role in evaluating the theoretical model's explanatory power and discriminating among alternative explanations of the results. In this paper we analyze and estimate, using VHBB's data, the learning model in Ž . Broseta 1993 . In that model, the shocks representing idiosyncratic differences in players' beliefs follow a nonstationary autoregressive condi-Ž Ž . . tional heteroskedasticity process of order 1 ARCH 1 , a specification Ž often used in the financial and time-series econometrics literature as . discussed below . The key insight that such a process yields for the Ž learning dynamics follows from the property that its variance representing . the average level of strategic uncertainty in the population is, in general, positively serially dependent. In behavioral terms, players' degree of uncertainty about each others' beliefs and choices exhibits some degree of persistence or inertia. This is what one would expect as players update their prior beliefs during the learning process, because each new observation along the path of play yields only partial information about the Ž . possibly, nonstationary stochastic process determining their best re-Ž . sponses. Second, the ARCH 1 specification yields a simple characterization of cross-sectional heterogeneity in players' choices and beliefs. It should be interpreted, in fact, as a reduced form for idiosyncratic differences of unknown form in players' beliefs and choices; as a result, it makes it possible to detect the existence of such differences empirically without Ž . relying on any explicit and possibly ad-hoc assumptions on their probabilistic structure. Finally, the ARCH hypothesis results in a parsimonious parameterization of the learning dynamics and makes it possible to test the main behavioral hypotheses underlying the theoretical model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes VHBB's experimental coordination environments and results. Section 3 Ž . discusses the ARCH 1 specification and presents a convergence result that is relevant to the interpretation of the econometric model and the empirical results. Section 4 extends the learning model to VHBB's environments with discrete strategy spaces and briefly discusses the econometric specification; the reader interested in the details is referred to Broseta Ž . 1997 . Section 5 reports the estimation, hypothesis testing, and simulation results. Section 6 contains our concluding remarks.
Ž .

VHBB's 1990, 1991 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS AND RESULTS
We now define a class of complete information normal-form games which includes, as particular cases, VHBB's coordination environments.
Ž . Consider n n G 2 players with symmetric roles who choose an action x î Ž . Ä 4Ž . i s 1, . . . , n from the finite set X s 1, 2, . . . , K KG 2 , and let x ŝ n Ž . x , . . . , x g X denote a strategy profile. Player i's payoffs depend on1 n his or her own strategy choice, x , and on an order statistic of the entirê i Ž . strategy profile e.g., the minimum or, when n is odd, the median denoted Ž . Ž . y ' f x . For any given n and f и , they are assumed to be strictlŷî ncreasing in the value of the order statistic and strictly decreasing in the distance between the order statistic and player i's strategy choice. It is easy to show that, for any order statistic other than the maximum, the game then has exactly K symmetric, strict Nash equilibria in which x s ŷ i Ž .
2 i s 1, . . . , n , and that these are the only pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore, the above equilibria are strictly Pareto-ranked, with the equilib-Ž . Ž . ria at which x s y s K i s 1, . . . , n and x s y s 1 i s 1, . . . , n yield-ˆˆî i ing the highest and lowest payoffs, respectively, for all players. We have thus characterized a class of coordination environments; a game within Ž . this class is defined by specifying the treatment¨ariables, n and f и , and a payoff function with the above properties.
Even though there are no incentive problems to sustain the efficient equilibrium, the players may face a nontrivial coordination problem in this type of environment because it is best for a subject to play his or her part of that equilibrium only if he or she thinks it is likely enough that enough other subjects will do so. We refer to players' uncertainty about each 2 The result follows directly from our assumptions on payoffs and from the observation that, for nonextreme order statistics, individual deviations from a pure strategy equilibrium Ž . cannot change the order statistic. When f и is the minimum individual deviations may lower it, but are not individually rational. Ž other's choices resulting from unpredictable, idiosyncratic differences in . their beliefs as strategic uncertainty. In the presence of strategic uncertainty, an individually rational player will weight the higher payoff of choosing the highest effort level, K, with the risk of a lower payoff when enough other players choose a lower action. In other words, players' strategy choices are optimal only when they are based on sufficiently similar beliefs about how the game will be played.
In VHBB's experimental environments analyzed in this paper subjects were repeatedly faced with three different games from the class discussed above, the treatment variables being the number of players, n, and the Ž . order statistic determining their payoffs, f и . In all cases players were tô Ž Ä 4 . choose among 7 effort levels i.e., K s 7, so that X s 1, 2, . . . , 7 , the game was repeated for either 5 or 10 periods, and the resulting value of the order statistic ᎏbut not subjects' choicesᎏwas publicly announced after each repetition. Also in all cases, the experimental procedures insured that all subjects knew all the relevant details about the environ-Ž . Ž ments they faced; see VHBB 1990, 1991 for details. In VHBB's 1991, . Treatments ⌫ and ⌫dm baseline treatment, which we call the medium game treatment, the number of players in each of 6 experiments was set equal to 9 and the order statistic determining players' payoffs was the Ž . median of the entire strategy profile. In VHBB's 1990, Treatment A large-group minimum game treatment, the number of players in each of 7 experiments varied between 14 and 16 and the order statistic determining players' payoffs was the minimum of the entire strategy profile. In VHBB's Ž . 1990, Treatment C, Experiments 6 and 7 random-pairing minimum game treatment, players in the population were randomly paired each period with payoffs determined by the minimum of their current pair.
VHBB's results can be summarized as follows. First, the distribution of subjects' initial choices was roughly similar in all treatments and resulted in systematic equilibrium failures. In both the median and the large-group minimum games, subjects' choices and predictions for the first period of play 3 suggest the existence of significant strategic uncertainty: players not only respond heterogeneously to the multiplicity of equilibria in the game, but they also expect their opponents to respond differently than they did. In fact, only 10% of the subjects predicted an equilibrium outcome in period 1.
Second, the dynamics of the order statistic and players' choicesᎏas well as the limiting outcomesᎏdiffered sharply across treatments. In the median treatment, the limiting value of the group median after 10 periods 3 Except in the random-pairing minimum game, VHBB asked their subjects to predict their opponents' play for the first period and paid them in accordance with the accuracy of their predictions.
corresponded to an equilibrium outcome in 5 out of 6 experiments. None of them, however, was the efficient equilibrium; the limiting outcome was instead extremely history dependent in that it invariably coincided with the median that obtained in period 0, even though the latter was a historical accident that usually differed across experiments. In the large-group minimum game the order statistic and subjects' choices quickly tended towards the effort level corresponding to the most inefficient outcome, 1, independently of the initial value of the group minimum for all 5 experiments in which the first period minimum was not a 1. Finally, subjects' choices converged very slowly in the random-pairing minimum games, with no clearly discernible trend in the dynamics of the order statistic.
These remarkable experimental results raise some equilibrium selection issues that cannot be addressed by standard equilibrium analysis.
4 Since VHBB's subjects were uncertain only about each other's choices and their initial behavior was similar across treatments, these results suggest that strategic uncertainty affected the dynamics and limiting outcomes in ways that varied systematically with the treatment variables. The adaptive learn-Ž . Ž . ing models in Broseta 1993 and Crawford 1995 explicitly incorporate strategic uncertainty and go a long way towards a unified explanation of VHBB's results.
THE LEARNING MODEL
The learning model describes the dynamics of players' beliefs and strategy choices when a coordination gameᎏreferred to as the stage game ᎏbelonging to the class defined above is repeatedly played by a given population of n players. In this section, players' strategy choices are assumed to be continuously variable; we later extend the model to VHBB's discrete strategy spaces through a standard discrete choice model. The strategy set is now X : ᑬ; x denotes player i's strategy choice at time t it Ž . Ž .
n t s 0, 1, 2, . . . , , x ' x , x , . . . , x g X a strategy profile, and y ' t 1 t 2 t n t t Ž . f x g X the order statistic determining players' payoffs. The function t Ž . f и is assumed to be increasing and continuous in each of its arguments. Under the assumptions on payoffs stated in Section 2, the coordination stage game with continuous strategy spaces now has a continuum of symmetric, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. 4 
Ž .
Because all the pure strategy equilibria of the stage game s are strict. See Crawford Ž . Ž . 1995, Section 2 on how Harsanyi and Selten's 1988 theory of equilibrium selection does address some of the strategic issues raised by VHBB's games but still cannot provide a complete explanation of their results.
Adapti¨e Dynamics
We assume that players are boundedly rational in that they treat their Ž . estimates of the optimal action are assumed to evolve according to the linear adjustment rule,
Ž .
w x with initial condition x s ␤ q and ␤ g 0, 1 . The vector of inno-
. . , is assumed to be independently and identically t 1 t n t 2 Ž . distributed ex ante, with mean 0 and variance t s 0, . . . ; its condit tional distribution is discussed in detail below. The behavioral parameters Ä 4 ␤ , ␤ , ; t s 0, 1, 2, . . . are assumed to be exogenously given and are 0 t 1 t to be estimated for each of VHBB's median and minimum treatments. Ž . Although Eq. 1 has the form of a partial adjustment model, it is perhaps best viewed as an approximation to players' updating rules in the Ž spirit of the adaptive control literature see, for example, Ljung and Ž . Ž .. Soderstrom 1983 and Woodford 1990 . To see why, recall that x it denotes a player's estimate of the optimal action, given his or her current Ä 4 beliefs about the y process. Any preciseᎏbut formally tractable and t Ž empirically relevantᎏmodel of players' updating rules i.e., of the dynam-. ics of the x 's would then require explicit assumptions on the probabilistic it structure of their beliefs and their differences. The key insight of the Ž . adaptive control literature is that simple linear rules like 1 , in which the dynamics of players' optimal choices depend on their past choices, publicly 5 This simplifying assumption seems reasonable when n is large, is justified in VHBB's Ž Ž . . environments Crawford 1995 , Footnote 12 , and allows extension of the model to all order Ž . statistics and to their convex combinations as well . available information, and an error component, can be used to model the learning process without requiring a detailed parametric representation of agents' beliefs about the stochastic structure of the payoff-relevant variables.
Second, the model explicitly incorporates strategic uncertainty, i.e., idiosyncratic differences in players' beliefs, statistically through the vector of innovations . Players will have different prior beliefs about the t Ä 4 process generating y and their updating rules may also differ so that, t even when they observed the same history of play and chose the same strategies in the past, their current strategy choices will be different. However, there are no informational asymmetries or externally observable differences across players on which to base a purely theoretical explanation of such idiosyncratic differences in beliefs, so that players are indistinguishable ex ante. We choose to characterize them statistically as random Ä 4 shocks, , representing how unobserved heterogeneity of unknown form t in players' beliefs will affect their choices along the path of play.
Ž .
An ARCH 1 Characterization of Differences in Players' Beliefs
The key role of the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity Ž . ARCH hypothesis in this paper is to model how strategic uncertainty may evolve during the learning process by imposing some very general structure Ž . both across time and agents on the variance᎐covariance matrix of the Ä 4 Ž innovations . More precisely, an ARCH process of order p or t Ž .. ARCH p is a stochastic process whose conditional variance depends Ž . linearly on p lags of the sample variances or squared residuals . We first Ž . introduce our ARCH 1 specification and then discuss why it can be usefully applied to learning environments in the presence of strategic uncertainty.
Ž . We assume that, conditional on I the nx1 vector of innovations ty1 t is jointly normally distributed with mean 0 and variance᎐covariance matrix w 2 x ⍀ . We further assume that ⍀ ' is diagonal to capture the idea that
in coordination environments players must form their beliefs and choose their strategies independently and that the 's are serially uncorrelated it Ž . for any given i. Finally, the main restriction imposed by the ARCH 1 Ž assumption is that the current conditional variance of i s 1, . . . , n;
w . . also Bollerslev et al. 1992 for a survey of earlier contributions , ARCHbased models with this type of serial correlation in second moments have been successfully applied in finance times᎐series analysis to the analysis of the persistence of unpredictable deviations from mean asset prices or volatility clustering.
Ž . We now discuss why the ARCH 1 hypothesis provides a simple and appealing behavioral characterization of how strategic uncertainty might evolve during the learning process in VHBB's environments. To this end, it is convenient to recall first the behavioral role played by the error terms within the learning model. When players are indistinguishable ex ante, idiosyncratic differences in their prior beliefs and possibly, in their updating rules, will make their choices differ in unpredictable ways along the Ä 4 path of play, as represented by . Such differences in players' beliefs and t choices will eventually vanish as they accumulate experience and learn to forecast the order statistic that determines their best responses.
Ä 4 We describe this learning process by assuming that the process is t heteroskedastic, with a variance that tends to 0 as t goes to infinity. As shown below, this ensuresᎏunder mild conditions on the behavioral parametersᎏconvergence of the path of play to a symmetric equilibrium of the coordination stage game.
Ž . The key insight provided by the hypothesis of nonstationary ARCH 1 disturbances follows from its implications that there is temporal dependence on conditional second moments and in particular, noting that taking 7 The above conditional normality assumption, together with our implicit assumptions that the coefficients ␣ and ␤ are constant across time, is convenient for the econometric 1 1 Ž . specification see Section 5 but is not required for the theoretical analysis of the model in Ž . Broseta 1993 . We introduce them here for simplicity.
Ž .
2 2 expectations in 2 yields s ␣ q ␣ for t G 1, that the uncondi-
Ž . tional variances of the random shocks are positively serially dependent. In other words, there is some degree of persistence, or inertia, in players' uncertainty about each other's beliefsᎏ and choicesᎏduring the learning process, because each individual observation of y yields only partial t Ä 4 additional information about the nonstationary joint distribution of y .
t
To gain some intuition suppose that, for unknown cognitive reasons, 8 subject k expects a high value of the order statistic and, accordingly, tends to play a high effort level at time t. We should then expect to observe, ex Ž . post, a large and in this case, positive prediction error . After the k t value of y is publicly announced, all players update their beliefs. But if t they do so sensibly, possibly according to standard statistical procedures that take into account their prior beliefs, the entire history of play, and the Ä 4 last observation from y , idiosyncratic differences in beliefs are likely to t persist in the near future. In particular we would expect that, as he or she clings to ''optimistic'' beliefs, agent k will still expect a high value of y , tq1 Ž . which is then likely to result, ex post, in a large and positive value of . In other words, and if idiosyncratic differences in beliefs tend to
persist in the shortrintermediate term, then the variances of the shocks that describe them will be serially correlated, which is precisely what the Ž . Ž . ARCH 1 specification in 2 implies.
Ž . Second, the coefficients in 2 provide a simple parameterization of the learning dynamics and will allow us to detect empirically whether differences in players' beliefs are, as expected, both idiosyncratic and endogenously determined by the history of the payoff-relevant variables along the Ž . Ž . path of play. To see why note that from Eqs. 1 and 2 and conditional on players' prior beliefs, players' initial estimates of the optimal action are independently and identically distributed with mean ␤ and common ␣ s 0, they will also be identically distributed with an exogenously given 1 variance 2 s 2 s ␣ ; one would then expect that ␣ ª 0 as t ª ϱ it t 0 t 0 t and the players learn to forecast the order statistic that determines their best responses. But if ␣ is different from 0, players' estimates of the 1 optimal action will not be identically distributed across subjects due to the dependence of the conditional variances on the sample variances, 2 , it which will, in general, differ across subjects and periods. Hence the value of ␣ indicates to what extent the dynamics of strategic uncertainty are 1 endogenously determined by individual players' past experience. 8 This may be because he or she believes in the saliency of efficiency as a coordination device. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting an example along these lines.
Ž . As a result, the ARCH 1 specification allows for a flexible characterization of both cross-sectional heterogeneity in players' choices and beliefs and of the learning dynamics. An additional advantage is that it can do so without requiring an explicit specification for the heteroskedasticity correction in the conditional variances in terms of lagged values of the payoff-Ž . 9 relevant variables x , y . In other words, and whenever ␣ is significantly t t 1 Ž . different from 0, the ARCH 1 specification will be picking up, through the Ž . sample variances in 2 , the effect of variables omitted from the model.
Ž . The existence of an ARCH 1 effect can then be interpreted as evidence of model misspecification, but this may be inevitable because VHBB's subjects are indistinguishable ex ante so that theory cannot yield useful restrictions on the stochastic structure of their beliefs. And, as a reduced form for individual heterogeneity, ARCH may still yield a better empirical approximation to VHBB's subjects behavior than imposing any explicit Ž . and possibly ad hoc probabilistic structure on their prior beliefs andror adjustment rules. Ž It is, in this sense, interesting to compare our specification with Crawford's 1995, Eqs. Ž . Ž .. 1 ᎐ 6 , which focuses more precisely on the structure of cross-sectional heterogeneity in Ž players' beliefs but yields a less flexible characterization of the learning dynamics see also . Section 5.4 . His ''structural'' form for the heteroskedasticity correction arises from the assumption that idiosyncratic differences in players' beliefs can be described by unpredictable differences in the coefficients of their updating rules. As a result, his conditional variance Ž . specification is heavily dependent on the linearity and separability assumptions implicit in 1 , Ž . depends on lagged values of x , y , and yields a more complicated expression for the
. unconditional variances Crawford 1995 , Eqs. 24 and 25 , which can only be approximated numerically.
10
Ž
The following analogy with the finance ARCH literature for which we thank an . Ž anonymous referee may help clarify this point. Volatility clustering in asset prices i.e., the Ž . Ž . . fact that small large price changes tend to be followed by small large changes is an important feature of many financial time series. An empirical model of the price-variance process for asset prices could be specified directly if we had a good theory of how trading volume and volatility are affected by, say, information releases or unexpected shocks in beliefs among investors. But absent such a theory, simply assumingᎏthrough an ARCH-like structure ᎏthat variances are serially correlated is a way to control for the observed persistence without imposing too much structure on the data.
. . , n and y con¨erge with probability 1 to a 
Ž . and the result follows by taking limits as t ª ϱ. Crawford's 1995 Proposition 2 can then be applied to prove convergence with probability 1.
Q.E.D.
Ä 4
To interpret the result note that the conditions on ␣ and ␣ ensure 0 t 1 that 2 ª 0 as t ª ϱ, so that ª 0 with probability 1 for all i s 1, . . . , n.
Hence, idiosyncratic differences in players' beliefs eventually vanish as they accumulate experience and learn to forecast the order statistic that Ä 4 Ä 4 determines their best responses, y . The conditions on ␤ and ␤ then t 0 t 1 Ž . ensure that, in the limit, x s y i s 1, . . . , n with probability 1, so that it t play converges to a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The interest of this convergence result comes largely from two empirical considerations. First, the model cannot provide a convincing explanation of VHBB's results unless there are significant differences in players' beliefs along the path of play, which makes it crucial to detect such differences Ž 2 empirically. If there is no heterogeneity in players' beliefs so that s t 2 . s 0 for all i and t as in standard equilibrium analysis, the model yields it Ž . ᎏfor any given n and f и ᎏa degenerate probability distribution over the path of play and is formally consistent with any sequence of equilibria in the stage game and any limiting coordination outcome, as determined Ä 4 exogenously by the values of ␤ . For nonnegligible levels of strategic 0 t uncertainty, each sample path of play will still lock-in on a particular Ž . equilibrium outcome as in most of VHBB's experiments , but the model now generates a nondegenerate probability distribution over paths of play and the set of limiting equilibria. For any given values of the treatment Ž . variables n and f и , the moments of this ex ante probability distribution Ä 4 depend on the behavioral parameters and on the effects of on the t Ä 4 Ä 4 paths of y and x . The comparative dynamics methods in Broseta . and 4 can then be used, maintaining the behavioral parameters constant, Ž . to describe how changes in the treatment variables n and f и will affect, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, this prior distribution over equilibria. These qualitative theoretical results are consistent with VHBB's results for the median and large-group minimum games, as well as with the Ž . additional experimental evidence obtained by Van Huyck et al. 1995 for nearby treatments.
Second, the learning model characterizes strategic uncertainty through random shocks that are, in fact, identified with the innovations in the econometric specification. As a result the model's goodness of fit will inevitably be limited, but it is important to keep in mind that it does not attempt to precisely predict individual players' choices along the path of play, nor the resulting outcomes, but probability distributions over equilibrium outcomes instead. Hence a key test of the model's explanatory power must rely on the comparison of its predictions with the patterns of equilibrium selection detected experimentally. We do so in Section 5 by simulating the model using the estimated parameters and comparing the resulting prior probability distribution over equilibria with VHBB's results.
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
In this section we extend the learning model to a dynamic, discrete-choice model for players' decisions in VHBB's experimental environments. In Ž . such a model the lagged sample variances in 2 become latent, unobserv-Ž . able variables and we specify our ARCH 1 conditional variances in terms of the generalized squared residuals, which are observable. We then derive an expression for the probabilities of players' choices along the path of play and derive the likelihood function of the empirical model. The reader Ž . interested in the econometric details should refer to Broseta 1997 .
Discrete Strategy Choices
An ordered discrete-choice model is the natural way to model how players' latent, unobservable choices in the learning model with continuous strategy spaces determine their observable, discrete counterparts in the stage games of VHBB's experimental environments. To see how, partition the state space of x , X : ᑬ, into K disjoint response categories or tively, equal to 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, . . . , and 6.5. Hence, x identifies the categorŷ it in which x falls simply by rounding it to the closest integer and by it Ž x Ž . mapping the classes C s yϱ, 1.5 and C s 6.5, qϱ into strategies 1 1 7
and 7, respectively. 11 Finally, the discrete value of the order statistic is now Ž . Ä 4 given by y s f x g 1, . . . , K .ˆt Ž . w x The nxT matrix x ' x of latent endogenous variables is not observit able. In order to estimate the behavioral parameters, however, we need to evaluate the conditional probability mass associated with each possible w x Ž . realization of x , or, equivalently, Pr x g C ks 1, . . . , K . Explicit it it k Ž forms for such probabilities are derived next from a latent model a set of statistical assumptions on the conditional distribution of the latent vari-. ables x , t s 0, . . . which takes into account the fact that only subjects' t discrete choices were observed in VHBB's experimental environments.
Ž .
The Latent ARCH 1 Model: Generalized Squared Residualŝ
Ä 4 Let I ' x , . . . , x denote the information set generated by the ob-t 0 t servable history of play up toᎏand includingᎏtime t. Conditional on I , the linear updating rule for player i's estimate of the optimal action ty1 Ž . in 1 can now be written, for t s 0, 1, . . . , T, as<
ity. Note that when the latent endogenous variables x are unobserved, it the sample residuals ' x m are not I -measurable. In other words,
and since all is known about x 's location when, say, x s k is observed iŝ it it Ž x that x s m q g a , a , all we know about the value of the
11 The assumption that the thresholds are equally spaced is restrictive, but rounding this way is optimal when players are risk-neutral and x is viewed as player i' . difficult using VHBB's relatively small datasets to estimate simultaneously the thresholds and the parameters of interest. In any case, the simulation results reported in Section 5 suggest that doing so is unlikely to improve the model's explanatory power. Ž .
w . w x with ' ␣ for all i, ␣ ) 0, ␣ g 0, 1 , and ' E ¬ I for all
. w x To interpret 6 , note that s E ¬ I is simply the projection of
Ž . Ž . the ARCH 1 conditional variance in 2 on the only available information Ž . set, I . It is easy to check that this extension of the original ARCH 1 ty1 process to a discrete choice model preserves the statistical properties of Ä 4 the unconditional distribution of discussed in Section 3. Hence our t Ž . contribution can be interpreted as a generalization of Engle's 1982 Ž . ARCH 1 regression process to a nonstationary, discrete choice model Ž . with latent residuals; see Broseta 1997 for details. It can also be interpreted, in the context of the econometrics of panel data literature, as a random effects model in second moments.
Next we use this latent model to derive closed form expressions for the probabilities of players' choices along the path of play and construct the likelihood function of the model. Recalling that, by definition, x s m q so that x s k whenever it it it it Ž x x g a , a , the conditional probability mass associated with player i's it ky1 k 12 Ž This approach is a natural extension of the inference procedures developed among . Ž . Ž . others by Chesher and Irish 1987 and Gourieroux et al. 1987 for grouped and censored models.
A Dynamic Ordered Probit Model of Subject's Choices
choice of strategy k s 1, 2, . . . , K at time t can now be written as
Ž . where ⌽ и is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution k Ž . and the scalars g is 1, . . . , n; k s 1, 2, . . . , K y 1; t s 0, . . . , T are it k
Ž .
0 K given by g s a y m r , with g s yϱ and g s qϱ. Our latent
Ž . Ž ARCH 1 model therefore generates an ordered probit model Amemiya, . 1981; McFadden, 1984 in which individual subjects' choice probabilities are nonstationary, as required by the learning process.
In order to derive a closed form expression for the generalized squared 
Ž . where и is the density of a standard normal variate. The conditional Ž . lihood of x, L x, , can be sequentially factored so that according to 7 ,
The final form of L x, used to estimate the model obtains from
Ž . substitution of 5 , 6 , and 8 ᎏunder the intertemporal constraints discussed belowᎏand the numerical values of the thresholds into the g k 's, it Ž . as defined above. Since we are not aware of any results on the global Ž . concavity of the likelihood function in 9 , we conducted an extensive search for different sets of initial values and then checked the robustness of our estimates at convergence by reestimating the model for different initial values of the parameters. Under our distributional assumptions on the innovations, estimation by maximum likelihood will yield consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the behavioral parameters in the latent model of Section 4.2.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Model Specification and Hypothesis Testing
Ž . The model in Section 4 has 2T q 4 parameters and is clearly susceptible of overfitting; a more parsimonious specification will also allow for a stronger test of the learning model's predictive ability when comparing its qualitative implications with VHBB's experimental results. We therefore decided to impose the strongest intertemporal constraints on the parameters compatible with both an accurate description of the learning dynamics and the spirit of the learning model. First recall that, for each experimental treatment, ␤ and ␣ describe the initial conditions in conditional 00 00 means and variances, respectively. Since players' prior beliefs and their learning rules follow, ex ante, different stochastic processes, the initial conditions are characterized independently of the trend terms both in conditional means and variances. Next, we assume that the trend terms in conditional means remain constant for t G 1 so that ␤ ' ␤ . Finally, we 0 t 01 . 1991 data , with 54 observations per period. Given the size of VHBB's strategy spaces, the lack of sample variation in players' choices when the dynamics were close to convergence made it difficult to identify the conditional variance parameters in the later periods of the median game.
13
The sample size for the large-group minimum game dataset was 9 periods 13 Ž . In treatments ⌫ and ⌫ dm, 83% of VHBB's 1991 subjects were best responding to their group median by period 5; with one exception, they never changed their choice afterwards. And of the 12 subjects that changed their choices between periods 6 and 10, only 4 did so more than once. Ž Ž . . out of the 10 covered by VHBB's 1990 data and 107 observations per period.
14 Finally, the sample size for the random-pairing minimum game was 5 periods, with 16 subjects per period.
We are interested in running the following log-likelihood ratio tests on Ž the parameters of the model with the corresponding null hypotheses in . Ž . parentheses and 1 degree of freedom in all cases : H1 existence of a Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . trend ␤ s 0 ; H2 adaptive behavior ␤ s 0 ; H3 learning s 0 , 01 1 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . and H4 ARCH 1 -type heteroskedasticity ␣ s 0 . H1 provides a strong 1 test of the model's ability to describe the dynamics in the median game Ž . because the patterns of history dependence detected by VHBB 1991 are Ž . incompatible with the existence of a strong drift of either sign in players' choices. The last two hypotheses address the fundamental aspects of the Ž . learning model. First, rejecting H3 is evidence that the process describing subjects' choices is nonstationary, with differences in players' beliefs vanishing in the shortrintermediate term as they learn to forecast the order Ž . statistic. Second, the main interest of H4 lies in detecting both positive Ž serial correlation in second moments a measure of persistence or inertia . in subjects' uncertainty about each other's choices and the dependence of subjects' idiosyncratic differences in beliefs on the history of the payoff-Ž . relevant variables. Hence, rejection of H4 is evidence of generic and persistent idiosyncratic differences in beliefs, as well as of their endogenous nature. Tables IV, V , and VI. We set n s 9, T s 7 , Ž . Ž . n s 16, T s 9 , and n s 16, T s 5 for the median game, the large-group minimum game, and the random-pairing minimum game, respectively. Obviously the last period in each treatment is, in all cases, the hardest to predict and the best indicator of the model's ability to replicate VHBB's patterns of equilibrium selection. Tables IV᎐VI also contain period by   2   Ž . period tests of homogeneity always with 6 degrees of freedom and VHBB's empirical frequencies for the group median and minimum. Since their interpretation is complicated by issues of temporal dependence and lack of sample variation, these test results should be interpreted with caution. . 10 , and 13.928 -2 и 10 , respectively. Hence, the hypothesis that there is no trend in subjects' updating rules cannot be rejected by the data. And the constraints that rule out adaptive behavior, learning effects, Ž . andror ARCH 1 -type disturbances are all strongly rejected by the data. Finally, and since ) 1, the parameter estimates can explain the strong patterns of convergence VHBB observed along the lines of Section 3's Proposition.
Results for the Median Game
Even though the group median always remained constant in this environment, so that subjects' best responses in any given experiment never changed with time, some interesting patterns emerge from the data. First, the unconditional variances 2 ᎏwhich can be computed from the estit Ž . mated parameters and Eq. 3 ᎏare 2.27, 1.51, 0.82, 0.45, and 0.26 in periods 0 to 4, respectively; by period 10, when only one subject was not Ž .
2 best responding, the out of sample estimate of is only 0.048. This 10 suggests that strategic uncertainty is present in significant amounts in earlier periods and that it decreases steadily as the experimental subjects accumulate experience forecasting the group median. Second, it is easy to Ž 2 determine from the estimated parameters and the expression s ␣ q to the levels of these unconditional variances was 69% in periods 1 to 4. Since ␣ s 0.396 is significantly different from 0, this suggests a higĥ 1 degree of persistence in second moments. In other words, subjects' current assessments of uncertainty about their opponents' choices are strongly correlated with their initial levels of strategic uncertainty and their past experience. Table IV reports the simulation results for the first seven periods of the median game. As expected, the group median exhibits no apparent drift of either sign and its prior frequency distribution is virtually independent of t.
The correlation coefficient between the median in periods 1 and 7ᎏa measure of the degree of history dependenceᎏis 0.75. As in VHBB's Ž . 1991 baseline treatments, 4 and 5 are the modal values of the group median in all 7 periods and always account for at least 78% of the total number of observations. 16 Finally, the frequencies with which players' discrete choices are in Nash equilibrium for the empirical and simulated frequency distributions are, respectively, 17% and 16% in period 4, 33% and 29% in period 5, and 50% and 45% in period 6. We conclude that the learning model also captures fairly well the rates at which subjects' choices converged to their respective group medians.
Results for the Large-Group Minimum Game
The parameter estimates reported in Table II Table IV reveal that, as predicted by Ž the model, the dynamics of y exhibit a strongly negative drift often t . noticeably stronger than the experimental results suggest and, given the lower bound on players' strategy choices, little or no history dependence. The prior probability that y s 1 is greater than 0.97 and the prior 2 probability that y s 1 is 1 for t G 6. Given the parameter estimateŝ t 16 Note that the model's ability to track these modal values follows from using the estimated parameters in the simulations. The model being able to replicate the patterns of history dependence, however, does not.
Ž
. especially for the conditional variances , the high number of players, and the strength of the minimum rule, it seems highly unlikely that these results could be reversed in later periods. Tables VI and VII show that the model provides a less convincing explanation of the dynamics in the random-pairing minimum game. The following characteristics of VHBB Ž . 1990 's random-pairing environments may help explain why the ARCH specification provides a less satisfactory description of the data for this Ž Ž . . treatment. First, it can be shown see Crawford 1995, Footnote 10 that when the subjects in the population are randomly paired each period, and Ž . given VHBB's 1990, Treatment C payoff functions, a risk-neutral player's best response is actually given by the median choice in the population and not by his current pair's minimum. 17 Since the subjects were informed only about the latter, they received noisy information about the summary statistic that determined their best responses. This additional source of Ž . errors is likely to be picked up by the ARCH 1 specification which will not be able, however, to identify it separately from the dynamics of strategic Ž . uncertainty or heterogeneity in players' beliefs . Second, only VHBB's Ž . Ž . 1990 Experiment 6 with 16 subjects and 5 periods could be used to 17 Hence the predictions of the theoretical model for the dynamics of the order statistic need to be compared with the actual frequency distributions of the population median Ž . obtained by VHBB 1990 , as we do in Table VI . y5 . -10 , respectively. We conclude, tentatively, that the failure of the ARCH model to accurately describe the learning dynamics in this treatment can be attributed to the fact that subjects received noisy information about the order statistic determining their best responses, as well as to the small sample size and the lack of identifiable dynamics in the experimental Ž . data. Even though the ARCH 1 model successfully detects idiosyncratic differences in beliefs in this treatment through ␣ , its emphasis on thê 1 dynamics of learning and its role as a reduced form for modelling conditional heteroskedasticity do not allow a precise enough characterization of such differences across players. Specifications of the conditional variance that focus more precisely on the structure of cross-sectional dispersion in Ž Ž . . any given period such as Crawford's 1995 might yield a better fit for the strategic environment and time horizons considered here.
Results for the Random-Pairing Minimum Game
CONCLUSION
Ž .
The main contribution of this paper is the extension of an ARCH 1 stochastic process to game-theoretic learning environments with significant levels of strategic uncertainty. By modelling persistence in the second moments of the stochastic process representing idiosyncratic differences in players' beliefs, ARCH-type processes capture the idea that some degree of inertia in players' assessments of uncertainty is likely to be present as they update their beliefs during the learning process. They also provide a Ž reduced form for differences of unknown form in players' beliefs without . requiring any assumptions on their probabilistic structure and a parsimonious parametric description of the learning dynamics.
Our empirical results provide further support for the theoretical models Ž . Ž . in Crawford 1995 and Broseta 1993 , by showing that the interaction of nonnegligible levels of strategic uncertainty with the adaptive learning dynamics and the treatment variables can provide a unified explanation for the patterns of equilibrium discrimination detected by VHBB. Further-Ž . more, the parameter estimates were used by Van Huyck et al. 1995 to simulate the limiting prior probability distribution over coordination outcomes for nearby treatments, which was then compared with the additional experimental evidence. In most cases, their results indicate that the latter is consistent with the models' predictions.
Directions for further research include extending the specification and estimation techniques developed here to the empirical analysisᎏusing experimental dataᎏof other game-theoretic environments in which strategic uncertainty and the learning dynamics may play a role in equilibrium selection and for which the main interest lies in the study of the shortrintermediate-run dynamics of players' interactions and not the long-run Ž issues usually addressed in theoretical models as, for example, in Craw-Ž . Ž .. ford and Isaac et al. 1989 . Finally, a detailed analysis of the asymptotic properties and inference procedures for the ARCH-type latent model introduced in this paper also deserves some further attention.
